“[But] that does not reduce the competition or the conflicts between China and US in other fields, especially not in the domain of technology … [and] if Trump wins the coming election, I think China and the US will have more conflicts in the economic [field].”
The November 15 summit saw Chinese President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Joe Biden agree to manage differences, after prolonged tensions had sparked widespread concerns over global instability.
A string of high-level exchanges since that summit, including recent visits to China by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, as well as working group meetings to address contentious issues, have been seen as positive signs of the rival powers’ willingness to engage.
But what Beijing calls Washington’s “containment drive” continues on all fronts. The US has taken aim at Chinese manufacturing “overcapacity”, moved to restrict Chinese access to sensitive technologies, and increased strategic coordination with regional allies to counter China’s technological and military ambitions.
Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee set to take on Biden in the November 5 presidential election, has threatened to impose 60 per cent tariffs on all Chinese imports if he is re-elected.
After a first term marked by a range of trade tariffs on Chinese products and frequent anti-China rhetoric, Trump’s campaign promise has triggered concerns over a full-blown economic war with Beijing.
At Monday’s forum, hosted by the University of Hong Kong’s Centre on Contemporary China and the World, Yan said China would aim to avoid a new cold war with the US while working to narrow their economic and technological gap, but would have to respond if the “containment” continued.
“China has to [respond] to the decoupling, de-risking policy from the US,” he said, adding that when the major powers resort to “a tit-for-tat strategy, this creates a kind of a mutual imitation”.
A longer-term strategic response would be for China to shape a “favourable geopolitical environment” for itself, Yan said, though he conceded that that would be difficult as the world order is still dominated by the United States and its allies.
This US-dominated order obstructs the development of China and other nations, he said.
Apart from managing tensions with the US, China has also been trying to strengthen its hand by improving relations with US allies such as in Europe and seeking the support of the “Global South”.
Xi is currently on a three-nation European tour viewed as a charm offensive to regain the trust of the continent as it mirrors many US-led trade restrictions on China, while driving a wedge between the US and its European Union and Nato allies as cracks begin to show over America’s security commitment to Ukraine and Israel.
China has ramped up efforts to present a united voice with the Global South, hitting out at the US position on Gaza and being vocal on justice for Palestinians. It has also sought to bolster the power of Brics, a developing nations’ bloc expanded to 10 members last year and seen as a counterweight to the Group of Seven industrialised nations.
“Europe [has] more impact on the world than other American traditional allies,” Yan said.
“And it’s not a secret, the Chinese government has frequently repeated that China [relies] heavily on the Global South states … as long as we get the support from the majority of the Global South states and then we can have a basic political base in the world.”